Dates for Your Diary

6th November 2008, 6.30. AGM and talk on DD v LKW at Club Lusitano, 27th Floor, 16 Ice House Street, Central. (More information to follow shortly).

2nd
October 2008, 6.30. Next Committee meeting.

15th December 6.30 at the Hong Kong Club HKFLA Christmas Quiz (All Welcome!)

XVIIth ISPCAN International Congress
which will be held in Hong Kong 7th to 10th September 2008. Details here.

3rd Asia Pacific Regional Conference of The Hague Conference on Private International Law. 24th, 25,& 26th September (jointly hosted with the Department of Justice, by invitation)

香 港 家 庭 法 律 協 會

The Hong Kong Family Law Association is primarily, but by no means exclusively, made up of solicitors and barristers working in the field of family law and in particular children and ancillary relief. The HKFLA holds regular talks and acts as a conduit to raise a broad range of family law and related matters with government, the judiciary and the public. It is run by a committee of practitioners working in children and family law and is generously supported by the Family Court and the wider judiciary, who often attend our public meetings.

Membership of the HKFLA is open to all but in particular to professionals working in the area of children and family law and policy. As well as lawyers the HKFLA is pleased to provide a platform for a broad cross-section of professionals working and researching in this area. Thus, the HKFLA welcomes paediatricians, psychiatrists, psychologists, social work professionals, mediators, educationalists, academics and students as well as family lawyers. Anyone whose work involves children and family related matters is most welcome to join and to participate in the work of HKFLA.

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Students: $75 ($75 each 1st September thereafter)

請按這裏下載申請表
Membership Forms and Fax to 2157 5533 or send attachment via e-mail link below.


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會員在加入協會時需要繳交港幣五十元的入會費。會員的年費是港幣一百元(每年可能會調整)。學生會藉的年費則是港幣七十五元。

會員是享有研討會收費的折扣優惠。舉例來說,現時研討會的標準收費是港幣一百五十元,而會員只需付港幣一百元,學生會員則只需付港幣五十元。

請把填妥的會員申請表連同一張劃線支票(支票抬頭請寫"香港家庭法協會"),寄到以下地址:

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PAYMENT

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All Payments to the HKFLA may be made by Credit Card. To Join or Renew Membership or to pay for our Guest Lectures at the Hong Kong Club, just click on the 'Make a Donation' button below.

Interim proposals on a sex offender register

Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (Sexual Offences Sub-committee)


Penology and criminology
Sex Offenders Register

A consultation from the Law Reform Commission's Review of Sexual Offences Sub-committee contains interim proposals on a sex offender register. It proposes the establishment of an administrative scheme to enable employers of persons undertaking child-related work and work relating to mentally incapacitated persons to check the criminal conviction records for sexual offences of prospective employees. Copies are available from http:// www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/docs/sexoff_e.pdf [Accessed July 29, 2008]. Comments by October 31, 2008.

http://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/docs/sexoff_e.pdf

EU Directive on Mediation

THURS 18/06/2008 - The European Parliament and the Council have approved a Directive on mediation covering civil, commercial and family matters. In addition to encouraging the use of mediation in cross-border disputes the Directive provides, for the first time, a framework around which parties can proceed with mediation safe in the knowledge that, should the mediation fail, matters that were raised will be kept confidential by mediators and that they will not lose the opportunity to take their dispute to court by the expiration of limitation periods. Bridget Prentice, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Justice said: "The Government believes that courts should be the last resort for people involved in civil or family disputes and has supported this proposal as a means of encouraging the use of mediation in cross-border disputes throughout the European Union. The UK gave priority to this initiative in the early stages of its negotiation during our Presidency of the EU in 2005 and I welcome its agreement." The European Commission issued its proposal for a Directive in October 2004. The European Parliament gave its first opinion in March 2007 and the Council of European Justice Ministers reached a final agreement on the text in November 2007. Following agreement of the Council's text by the European Parliament in April 2008 the Directive has now been adopted. Member States will have until June 2011 to comply with its provisions. The Directive is available on the EUR-Lex website. Jordans Family Law News Watch

Mediation Not a Breach of Right to Fair Trial?

Mediation in UK: Judiciary should direct more parties to mediate

© Crown Copyright
Master of the Rolls, Sir Anthony Clarke

6/05/2008 - The Master of the Rolls has said that judges should direct more litigants to mediate before taking disputes to trial.

Speaking at the Civil Mediation Council's second national conference in Birmingham last week, Sir Anthony Clarke said that the power exists for the courts to regularise mediation and to make it an integral part of the litigation process.

Sir Anthony said that "far too many people know far too little about mediation. I think we can all agree that this has to change... it must become such a well established part of [our litigation culture] that when considering the proper management of litigation it forms as intrinsic and as instinctive a part of our lexicon and of our thought processes, as standard considerations like what, if any expert evidence is required and whether a Part 36 Offer ought to made and at what level."

In order for this to happen Sir Clarke said lawyers and judges will need educating so that mediation becomes second nature to them.

In his speech, Sir Anthony said that the judges' approach in the landmark Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust appeal court case had been 'overly cautious'. This case ruled that compulsory ADR would breach the right to fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights as it would amount to an unacceptable constraint on the right of access to the court.

Sir Anthony said that there may grounds for suggesting that Halsey was wrong to on the Article 6 point. "If mediation is successful it does obviate the need to continue to trial, but that is not the same as to waive the right to fair trial. If it were, any consensual settlement reached either before or during civil process could arguably amount to a breach of Article 6, which clearly cannot be the case", he said.

Jordans Family Law News Watch.

Listening to Children Judge Peter Boshier (Principal Family Court Judge New Zealand).

Association of Family and Conciliation Courts Annual Conference "Listening to Children's Views in Disputed Custody and Access Cases" Judicial Interviews in New Zealand

Judge Peter Boshier

Vancouver, BC, Canada

29 May 2008


Introduction

In recent years, both in New Zealand and internationally, the involvement of children in decision-making that directly affects them has received considerable attention. In New Zealand one of the most significant steps to facilitating such involvement has been domestic adherence (The Care of Children Act 2004) to international agreements (UNCROC). As a consequence New Zealand’s legal processes now encapsulate many of the intellectual shifts in relation to children, recognising them as legitimate people in their own right within families.[1]

At an operational level, the passing of this legislation has also seen a major shift in the way the New Zealand Family Court operates when children are directly involved. We interpret the legislation as placing particular importance on children’s views, and facilitate this in our jurisdiction through processes encapsulated within practice notes and judicial guidelines. Without doubt the Act represents an unmistakable shift towards the recognition of greater rights for children and allows for their greater input in decision-making processes[2].

Further guidance on how the Act facilitates the means of child participation has been proffered by the High Court.[3] There it was held that the child’s wishes should be introduced “primarily” through either counsel for the child or through an interview with the Judge.

What I therefore propose to do in this paper is outline the sections of the Care of Children Act that pertain to children’s views, and explore how, through lawyer-for-the-child and judicial interviews, we as a Family Court move to give due consideration to children’s views. I will also explore the intricacies of how this is put into practice on a daily basis by taking you through a case scenario.

Rationale for Child Participation

Whilst the New Zealand legislature (through the Care of Children Act 2004) makes it clear that the Courts are to take note of children’s views, it is useful to address where the rationale for child participation comes from. From a regulatory standpoint, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC) is extremely illuminating; particularly Article 12, which deliberately notes that children have a right to express their views freely in all matters that affect them. Furthermore s27(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 affirms a right relevant to a child by requiring the Court to observe the principles of natural justice when making a determination which affects a person’s rights which are protected or recognised by law. This combination of international and national legislation I believe provides a compelling argument for this increased level of child participation.

Yet legislative change is driven by changing societal attitudes and it is to that which I now want to turn. The concept of listening to children in family court proceedings is not an isolated topic, but rather one part of far-reaching changes. Our beliefs pertaining to children and families, and their place within society, have evolved remarkably quickly over the last three decades. Children’s right to participate in proceedings that affect them is but one facet of this general recognition of giving children the respect to which they are entitled, and there are a number of reasons why the right to participation is particularly important.

Firstly, it recognises children’s basic dignity and the place of participation in society as a right. In this regard it recognises the child’s right to be heard and acknowledged[4] (as long as they do not feel burdened by any of the responsibility for the outcome).[5]

It also acknowledges the value of direct communication[6] and the likely beneficial effect on the judicial decision[7] since children are then sure the Judge knows exactly how they feel without any mixed messages or misinterpretations.[8]

Furthermore it is important for children in terms of development; for there is compelling evidence that participation impacts upon self-esteem, psychological functioning[9] and helps children develop self-efficiency so that they are able to move out from under the wings of their family.[10] This appears to be particularly prevalent when the child has very clear and strong views[11] and where the children are involved in contested matters.[12]

Judges also see the consideration of children’s views as important. For them children’s views are seen to assist decision-making,[13] to enhance the process itself[14] and may, therapeutically, directly assist the children.[15]

The Care of Children Act 2004

With the research having clearly indicated that children’s views should be taken into account by the Family Court both directly and indirectly, the New Zealand Parliament reflected the views of the wider New Zealand community in 2004 by enacting the Care of Children Act. This legislation was intended to substantially shift the framework of child involvement in Family Court hearings.

Of particular note was the introduction of section 6 entitled “Child’s Views”, which reads as follows:

Section 6 – Child’s Views:

(1) This subsection applies to proceedings involving –

a. The guardianship of, or the role of providing day-to-day care for, or contact with, a child; or

b. The administration of property belonging to, or held in trust for, a child; or

c. The application of the income of property of that kind.

(2) In proceedings to which subsection (2) applies, -

a. A child must be given reasonable opportunities to express views on matters affecting the child; and

b. Any views the child expresses (either directly or through a representative) must be taken into account.

At its core therefore, this section calls for children to be given a reasonable opportunity to express their views and for those views to be given appropriate consideration when determining the outcome of a case.

What section 6 does not envisage is the manner in which a child may express their views or what would constitute appropriate consideration. For this we must turn to section 7 of the Care of Children Act 2004 which gives the lawyer-for-the-child guidance on the ascertainment and representation of children’s views. It reads as follows:

Section 7 – Lawyer to act for child

(1) A Court may appoint a lawyer to act for a child who is the subject of, or who is a party to, proceedings (other than criminal proceedings) under this Act.

(2) However, unless it is satisfied the appointment would serve no useful purpose, the Court must make an appointment under subsection (1) if the proceedings –

a. Involve the role of providing day-to-day care for the child, or contact with the child; and

b. Appear likely to proceed to a hearing.

(3) To facilitate performance of the lawyer’s duties and compliance with section 6 (children’s views), the lawyer must, unless he or she considers it inappropriate to do so because of exceptional circumstances, meet with the child.

(4) The lawyer may call any person as a witness in the proceedings, and may cross-examine witnesses called by a party to the proceedings or by the Court.

Thus the Care of Children Act requires that a lawyer be appointed for a child in any proceedings involving their day-to-day care or contact that are likely to proceed to a hearing.

An appointment of this nature however necessarily imposes a number of obligations on the lawyer to facilitate and give greatest effect to the child’s right to participate. These include meeting with the child for the purpose of ascertaining his or her views, unless to do so would be inappropriate.[16]

It also involves explaining the outcome of any proceedings to the child. This later requirement is vitally important for it is of limited use to have a child involved in the process and then ignore them at the conclusion of it. Unquestioningly a child will be affected in an enormous way by the decision, whether it is eventually reached through mediation or judicial decision-making, and thus it is only proper that the consequences of such a decision are deliberately, and appropriately, conveyed to the child.[17]

Along with the final outcome, the legislation obliges the child’s lawyer to explain to the child any cultural, medical, psychiatric or psychological reports concerning them.[18] As with other obligations of this nature, the only exception to this rule is where, in the opinion of the lawyer, it would be contrary to the welfare and best interests of the child.[19] In this regard it is worth noting that it is part of the best practice agreed with psychologists that their reports should include a statement containing any reasons why, in their opinion, the report or any part of the reports should not be shown to the child.[20] Obviously the presence or absence of such reasoning would be highly influential in guiding a lawyer-for-the-child’s decision.

This operational expression of how New Zealand should go about obtaining the views of children through lawyer-for-the-child has been given further definition through a recent “Lawyer-for-the-Child: Code of Conduct Practice Note”[21] which we negotiated with the New Zealand Society Family Law Section. This has sought to re-align the duties of lawyers acting for children. In doing so it reinforced the important sections of the Care of Children Act, principally section six, as well as providing more exacting domestic adherence to the principles encapsulated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which New Zealand is, quite rightly, a signatory.

In substance, the Practice Note sets out the guiding principles and the role of lawyer-for-the-child by reiterating the underlying principles of the Care of Children Act – that the best interests and welfare of the child are paramount - whilst constantly returning to the concepts espoused in sections six and seven of the Act. It also guides the lawyer’s relationship with both the child and the Court as well as furthering ancillary matters. As a consequence, it has the ability to promote quality and consistency of practice without burdening lawyers with rules that prohibit the exercise of professional judgment.

Whilst the statute and guidelines provide a solid basis for the role of lawyer-for-the-child, they provide no express direction on how exactly the lawyer should act for the child. As a consequence vigorous and significant debate on this point has arisen in New Zealand.[22] I believe it is now fairly uncontested that lawyers acting for children must assume a very different role from those representing adults.[23] Where debate therefore exists is in whether the lawyer-for-the-child should universally advocate the child’s views even if the lawyer does not believe those views to be in the best interests and welfare of the child; or whether the child’s views should be subservient to what the lawyer believes to be the best interests and welfare of the child.

I strongly believe that the obligation that rests on the child’s lawyer is to always present the views of the child to the Court regardless of whether they believe they are in the child’s best interests. Any deviation from this role would negate the child’s right to participate. However, the lawyer can then, and I submit should inform the court of whether he or she believes the child’s views to be contrary to the child’s best interests and welfare. With all the information at hand, the Court, who should be the arbiter of fact and law, can determine the congruency or otherwise of the child’s views with their best interests and welfare. In reading the legislation this way, I believe we encapsulate the totality of the Care of Children Act without resorting to examining either section six or section seven in isolation.

There are considerable signs that this “direct representation” view is being promulgated by others, including the Family Law Section of the New Zealand Law Society,[24] and indeed is strongly supported by the principles in UNCROC Article 12. I hope its development continues.

Preparation for Judges Interviewing Children

Clearly however, the receipt of the child’s views via the lawyer-for-the-child is an indirect way of receiving children’s views. This raises particular concern as valuable research has shown that children are not uniformly happy with how their views are interpreted when conveyed indirectly.[25] Consequently, and in light of both case law[26] and the language of rule 54 of the Family Courts Rules 2002,[27] judicial interviews have come to form an invaluable part of the toolbox of Family Court Judges.

Judges in New Zealand have themselves expressed the value of judicial interviews, with Judge O’Dwyer noting their worth in assessing children’s views, wishes, level of understanding and maturity.[28] Furthermore, Judge Neal has noted that he benefited from seeing the child not so much for what they said, but from being able to make his decision with a personality in mind rather than in a vacuum relying on the evidence alone.[29]

In an effort to facilitate the most effective judicial interviews New Zealand’s Family Court Judges have addressed the issue themselves. The result has been the careful crafting of written guidelines regarding interviews and the admission of transcripts, which now allow the Judiciary to approach the task on an extremely principled basis. It has taken time and enormous effort. However, the end product has been well worth the effort involved.

I do however acknowledge that natural justice concerns are often raised when the issue of judicial interviews is discussed. Nevertheless, I believe many of these concerns have been abated in New Zealand through the now common-place recording of the interview, and subsequent provision to parties of either a transcript of the interview or an audio recording.[30] Such a practice is prudent in order to respect the natural justice rights of both the child and the parents. This is particularly so where the case is highly contentious or where a transcript may be necessary for appeal purposes.[31]

Thus, whilst I recognise concerns pertaining to natural justice exist, so long as these carefully crafted and robust guidelines are followed, the rights of both the child and the parties can be upheld.

Specialist Reports

To this point I have noted the importance of lawyer-for-the-child and judicial interviews as mechanisms by which the Court can hear children’s views, but I must also impress upon you that there is a third, albeit less frequently used method of obtaining children’s views – specialist reports.[32] However, the rationale behind such reports differs slightly from the other two methods in that the Family Court cannot order a psychological report solely for the purposes of ascertaining the child’s views.[33] The primary means of introducing the views of the child remains through the lawyer-for-the-child and judicial interviews. Whilst specialist reports are therefore invaluable in the appropriate circumstances they remain beyond the scope of this present paper.

Case Scenario

With the above theoretical framework in mind I want to take you through how we, as Judges in New Zealand, actually go about obtaining a child’s views in practice.

Firstly, when a case comes before us, a determination will be made as to whether a lawyer-for-the-child is necessary. If it is determined that one is, (and rarely is s7(2)[34] invoked), a lawyer-for-the-child will be appointed pursuant to section 7 of the Care of Children Act 2004.

The lawyer will then, almost always, meet with the child as this is usually the most reliable and consistent way for a lawyer to ascertain the child’s views in line with the statutory requirements. However, exceptions do exist, particularly where the child is opposed to meeting the lawyer or the lawyer judges’ further interviews would cause the child unnecessary distress. Such a situation could arise where allegations of physical and sexual abuse are the subject of the proceedings.[35]

However, the exceptions are extremely limited and the Court takes very seriously the importance of lawyers meeting with children. Indeed, the fact that the lawyer had not met with the child was raised as a ground of appeal in DLB v DLS[36]. Whilst the appeal was dismissed on other grounds Justice Cooper did note that there was no justification for the lawyer-for-the-child’s stance in this instance.

Judicial interviews may also be conducted at this stage. To give you a flavour of what occurs, I typically welcome a child, discuss with them matters unrelated to the case and show them around the Court room. The rationale behind this is simple, if they feel comfortable in their surroundings, and with the Judge, they are more likely to be frank and honest in their discussion, and the Judge will be able to elucidate more accurately the true view of the child, and importantly, whether or not they have been coached.

Secondly I will explain to the child what the proceedings are about, in terms that are applicable to their age and maturity. Listening to a child requires “being able to enter the child’s world; listening to very young children does not necessarily mean taking all their utterances at face value, but it does mean observing the nuances of how they exhibit stress, or curiosity or anxiety in a manner that is congruent with their maturity.”[37]

I then take considerable time to discuss with the child what they like about life with each parent. This may involve discussion of different places, weather, sport, pets; indeed anything that is in the reference framework of the particular child. This I can not emphasise enough. The framework that is set up is designed entirely to fit that particular child and their individual situation. With the different personalities and needs of each child that comes to us, different methods are appropriate in different situations. It is simply a matter of finding out what works for each child (hence the importance of a general introduction) in order to truly give children an opportunity to express their views if they wish to do so.

Finally I turn to the lawyer-for-the child, who is present at all times during the judicial interview, and ask him or her if there is anything they have discussed with the child that they would like me to know.

Whilst the above implies only one judicial interview will occur, it may be necessary for multiple discussions to take place particularly where proceedings are undertaken over a prolonged period. Indeed we may need to go further and provide children with a range of people they can talk to, but at the same time we must remain mindful of not subjecting them to a barrage of questioning.[38]

At this point the proceedings take place, with what I believe, is a solid foundation, having ascertained the child’s views both directly and indirectly. Children however are not brought into the hearing, as it is felt that this is not generally in their best interests. Instead, having met with the child the lawyer must present the child’s views to the Court. As I discussed previously this then allows the Court to determine whether these views are congruent with the child’s best interests.

The final role that the lawyer-for-the-child plays is to explain the effect of any order made to the child. Occasionally this is undertaken by a Judge, but certainly more often than not; this role is retained by the lawyer-for-the-child.

Conclusion

To conclude therefore, I hope this paper has shown the real importance New Zealand places on children’s views within the Family Court System. Whilst traditionally the advocacy of a child’s views has been minimised and primary attention given to the parents’ wants and needs, major attitudinal shifts have seen significant changes in this sphere. The evidence is clear; many children value the opportunity to interact with the decision-maker, even where a lawyer has advocated their views[39] because they then feel their view has been taken into account; even if, in the end, it is not followed. I strongly believe we must continue this trend, and take children’s views into account when considering what is in their best interests and welfare.

Footnotes

1 Judge Paul von Dadelszen, Judicial Reforms in the Family Court of New Zealand (Symposium of Chief Judges of Family Courts, Singapore, 23 July 2007), paragraph 13.

2 D v S FC Napier, FAM-1999-041-215, 26 September 2006, Judge Boshier, paragraph 42.

3 In the decision of the Full Court of the High Court: K v K [2005] NZFLR 28.

4 P. Parkinson et al, "Parents' and Children's Views on Talking to Judges in Parenting Disputes in Australia." International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 21 (2007) : 104.

5 P. Parkinson & J. Cashmore, "Judicial Conversations with Children in Parenting Disputes: The Views of Australian Judges." International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 21 (2007) : 185.

6 P. Parkinson et al, "Parents' and Children's Views on Talking to Judges in Parenting Disputes in Australia." International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 21 (2007) : 102.

7 Ibid, 84.

8 P. Parkinson et al, "Parents' and Children's Views on Talking to Judges in Parenting Disputes in Australia." International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 21 (2007) : 90.

9 Jan Doogue & Alistair Logan, Care of Children Act 2004, (New Zealand Law Society Seminar, May 2005), 15.

10 Mark Henaghan & P Tapp, "Family Law: Conceptions of childhood and Children's Voices � the Implications of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child" in Children's Voices: Research, Policy and Practice, ed. A. Smith et al, (Longman, Auckland, 2000), 92-106.

11 Ibid, 88.

12 Ibid, 89.

13 P. Parkinson & J. Cashmore, "Judicial Conversations with Children in Parenting Disputes: The Views of Australian Judges." International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 21 (2007) : 185.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid, 179.

16 Care of Children Act 2004, s7(3).

17 Care of Children Act 2004, s55(4).

18 Care of Children Act 2004, s134(5).

19 Care of Children Act 2004, s134(5).

20 Judge Peter Boshier, Family Court of New Zealand, Practice Note: Specialist Report Writers 4 (2006), http://www.justice.govt.nz/family/practice/notes/default.asp?inline=specialist-report-writers.asp

21 Judge Peter Boshier, Family Court of New Zealand, Practice Note 45: Lawyer for the Child: Code of Conduct (2007), http://www.justice.govt.nz/family/practice/notes/default.asp?inline=lawyer-for-the-child-code-of-conduct.asp

22 Nicola Taylor, Megan Gallop & Anne Smith, "Children and Young People's Perspectives on the Role of Counsel for the Child" Butterworths Family Law Journal 3 (2000) : 146.

23 Note however the Executive of the Family Law sections discussion paper on this subject "The Gluestein Paper": A Glustein, "New guidelines for lawyers acting for children", NZLS Family Law Section.

24 In "Best Practice Guidelines for Lawyers Representing Children � Discussion Paper, NZLS, 2006".

25 Cashmore, "Children's Participation in Family Law Matters" in Hallett and Prout (eds), Hearing the Voices of Children: Social Policy for a New Century (2003) 165 in Tapp, "Judges are Human Too: Conversation between the Judge and a Child as a Means of Giving Effect to Section 6 of the Care of Children Act 2004" New Zealand Law Review (2006) 39.

26 See Justice Priestley's comments that the use of the verb directly in s6(2)(b) did envisage the child expressing the views personally to the presiding judge in Brown v Argyll [2006] NZFLR 705 at paragraph [47].

27 This discusses the steps a Court may take to ascertain the wishes of a child or young person.

28 LJG v RTP [Child Abduction] [2006] NZFLR 589 Judge MNE O'Dwyer at paragraph [88].

29 Knight v Finn [2003] NZFLR 38 at paragraph [27].

30 See the discussion in J v M Family Court, North Shore 2004-044-001857, 20 April 2005.

31 Note that in Australia, an investigation by Parkinson and Cashmore found the principle that there should be no secret communications was seen as fundamental. See P. Parkinson & J. Cashmore, "Judicial Conversations with Children in Parenting Disputes: The Views of Australian Judges." International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 21 (2007) : 165.

32 Care of Children Act 2004, s132 and s133.

33 K v K [2005] NZFLR 28.

34 Care of Children Act 2004.

35 See for example R v P FC PMN FAM-1997-054-82, 20 June 2006.

36 [2007] NZFLR 263.

37 P Tapp, Examining Judicial Approaches to Interviewing Children, Paper given at LexisNexis Child Law Conference, March 2002, at p 10, drawing on G Pugh and D Seleck, "Listening to and Communicating with Young Children" in R Davie, G Upton, and V Varma (eds), The Voice of the Child � A Handbook for Professionals, London 1995 and N Lowe, and M Murch "Children's Participation in the Family Justice System: Translating Principles into Practice" in J Dewar and S Parker (eds), Family Law: Processes, Practices, Pressures, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003, at p 19.

38 Judge Paul von Dadelszen, Judicial Reforms in the Family Court of New Zealand (Symposium of Chief Judges of Family Courts, Singapore, 23 July 2007), paragraph 27.

39 P. Parkinson et al, "Parents' and Children's Views on Talking to Judges in Parenting Disputes in Australia." International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 21 (2007) : 84.

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Article 12(2) of the Hague Child Abduction Convention

In search of a settled interpretation of Article 12(2) of the Hague Child Abduction Convention

One of the exceptions to mandatory return of an abducted child under the Hague Convention on the Civil of Aspects of International Child Abduction 1980 is that the proceedings are commenced after the expiration of the period of 12 months from the wrongful removal or retention and that the child is now settled in its environment (provided for in Art 12(2) of the Convention). This article discusses critically the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Cannon v Cannon in relation to the interpretation of the concept of settlement in this exception and the scope of the discretion conferred by the provision. It is argued that courts should take a more child-centred approach in construing and applying the Convention in general and this provision in particular. In a postscript, the article analyses the later House of Lords decision in Re M(Abduction: Zimbabwe) which, while agreeing with the Cannon decision in relation to the scope of the discretion conferred by Art 12(2), takes a more child-centred approach to the exercise of discretion under the Convention.

For the full article see Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol 20, No 1, 2008.

Rhona Schuz is Senior lecturer and joint director of the Centre for the Rights of the Child and the Family at the Shaarei Mishpat Law College in Israel and a visiting lecturer in the Law Faculty of Bar-Ilan University (and formerly a lecturer in law at the London School of Economics).

Jordans Family Law News Watch

Hong Kong Take Note: Domestic Violence Reforms Backfire in UK

Monday 1th April 2008 The Domestic Violence Act 2007 has led to fewer victims of domestic violence seeking help, it was claimed today.

Victims of domestic violence who have violent partners are said to be reluctant seek a non-molestation order because breaching it is now a criminal offence and they fear their partners will get a criminal record or a prison sentence of up to five years. Prior to the Domestic Violence Act, which came into force last July, the matter would have been dealt with through the civil courts.

It is claimed that the situation could be putting around 5,000 people a year at increased risk. A spokesman for the Ministry of Justice said the department is setting up a meeting with judges to discuss the problem.

Judge John Platt, a circuit judge dealing with domestic violence cases, told the Times today that he estimated that the number of women seeking non-molestation orders had fallen by between 25 and 30% since July 2007 compared to 2006 figures when there were 20,000 such applications.

"Obviously this is a very worrying figure. Either offenders have changed their behaviour - which seems extremely unlikely - or the victims do not want to criminalise the perpetrators," Judge Platt told the Times.

A spokesman for Sir Mark Potter, president of the family division of the high court, confirmed that other judges were also worried about the decline in the number of applications for non-molestation orders.

Sir Potter was "very concerned that, for whatever reason, the legislation appears to have led to a reduction rather than an increase in the protection afforded to victims of domestic violence as a result of the change of the law", the spokesman said. (Source Jordans Family Law News Watch)

Recently Reported Judgments (Jordans Family Law Newswatch)

  • ANCILLARY RELIEF: B v B (Ancillary Relief) [2008] EWCA Civ 543 (Court of Appeal; Sir Mark Potter P, Wall and Hughes LJJ; 19 March 2008) One possible reason for departing from equality was recognised to be that there were assets that were the product not of efforts of different kinds during the marriage, but of inheritance by one spouse only. In this unusual case, in which the whole of the capital available to the parties had been brought into the marriage by the wife from a source entirely external to it, and in which the marriage had played no part, however indirectly, in the acquisition of any of the assets now available, dividing the assets approximately equally did not lead to a fair result. Although not a big money case, this was not a case in which the needs of the parties compelled the court to disregard the source of the assets.
  • ABDUCTION: Re F (Abduction) [2008] EWHC 272 (Family Division; Sir Mark Potter P; 22 February 2008) The mother had removed the children from Poland without informing the father. The father had been granted restricted parental authority by the Polish courts, involving only vital problems in connection with upbringing, education and medical treatment. The father did not take any action to have the children, now aged 13 and 11, returned to Poland until over 11 months after the removal.
  • PROPERTY: Laskar v Laskar [2008] Court of Appeal; Tuckey LJ, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury and Rimer LJ; 7 February 2008) The presumption that, in the absence of a specific declaration of trust by the parties, domestic property conveyed into joint names was held jointly and equally in terms both of legal and of beneficial interests, applied to a family home occupied by cohabitants, not to commercial property or property purchased as an investment. It was not right to apply Stack v Dowden to cases in which the primary purpose of the property purchase had been as an investment, even if there was a family relationship between the parties.
  • ANCILLARY RELIEF: Dixon v Marchant [2008] EWCA Civ 11 (Court of Appeal; Ward, Wall and Lawrence Collins LJJ; 24 January 2008) The wifes remarriage shortly after the making of a consent order providing for payment of a lump sum to capitalise her periodical payments did not constitute a Barder type event invalidating the basis or fundamental assumption upon which the order was made, notwithstanding that the wife had made a statement in the proceedings that she had no intention to cohabit or remarry. The agreement between the parties could have included whatever recitals were appropriate to spell out any common assumption about a moratorium on the wifes remarriage, there was nothing in the agreement that would have alerted the judge to an intention between the parties to give the husband a right to claw back any part of the lump sum if the wife were to remarry soon after the payment had been made. There had been nothing before the court to indicate that the wife had been fettering her right to remarry; the risk of remarriage was one the husband had had to accept. (Wall LJ dissenting.)
  • ANCILLARY RELIEF: SW v RC [2008] EWHC 73 (Fam) (Family Division; Singer J; 25 January 2008) When the person paying maintenance for a child could not do so out of income, but maintained a high rate of expenditure on himself and his family by use of capital and borrowings, there was no reason in principle why the childs maintenance should cease, or be reduced. Maintenance paid from accumulated or borrowed money (both resources of a capital nature) was maintenance in the form of income in the hands of the parent with care, not a lump sum or other capital resource.
  • ANCILLARY RELIEF: VB v JP [2008] EWHC 112 (Fam) (Family Division; Sir Mark Potter P; 29 January 2008) The language of the House of Lords in Miller/McFarlane was of general application and extended, where appropriate, to consideration by the court of the overall fairness of an order made upon an application to vary a joint lives periodical payments order. The wife's revised periodical payments award rightly included an element of compensation for relationship-generated disadvantage, given that the wife, who had not worked during the marriage, had by her efforts following separation clearly demonstrated that had she worked during the marriage her earning capacity, sacrificed during the marriage, would have been substantially greater on separation than it in fact was.
  • M v S [2007] HKEC 2119 Family law - ancillary relief - whether petitioner barred from applying for ancillary relief under s.9 by reason of remarriage - whether leave should be given under r.68(2) to apply for ancillary relief - Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (Cap.192) s.9 - Matrimonial Causes Rules (Cap.192, Sub.Leg.) r.68(2)
  • PFH v CMS [2007] HKEC 2210 (Children - custody - domestic violence - factors - included taking into sibling unity: children only one year apart and were very close - and status quo (see P v C in link below)

Latest News

HK police were called to 3,000 more family abuse cases last year. Police crime statistics showed that domestic violence cases topped 7,509, up 60% on 2006. Priscilla Lui Tsang Sun-kai, director of Against Child Abuse, said these reported cases represented only the tip of the iceberg. (SCMP, 1st February 2008).



Mills v McCartney (Judgment in full PDF) from Jordans Family Law NewsWatch

TUES 18/03/2008 - Following yesterday's publication of the summary judgment for the Mills-McCartney divorce ruling, the judgment has been revealed in full after Ms Mills was told she could not appeal against its publication.

In Mr Justice Bennett's High Court ruling he wrote that he gave Ms Mills "every allowance for the enormous strain she must have been under".

But he added: "I am driven to the conclusion that much of her evidence, both written and oral, was not just inconsistent and inaccurate but also less than candid".

"Overall she was a less than impressive witness," he said.

By contrast Mr Justice Bennett found Sir Paul to be a balanced witness. "He expressed himself moderately though at times with justifiable irritation, if not anger. He was consistent, accurate and honest" he wrote.

Mr Justice Bennett found Ms Mills' claim for £125 million exorbitant.

"Nevertheless, as I have said, the wife is (or at least was) prepared to accept £50m in lieu of a claim for £125m. That, in my judgment, can mean only one of two things; either the claim by the wife for £125m is a reasonable claim, in which case the enormous drop of £75m to £50m is inexplicable, or, the claim for £125m is and was unreasonable, indeed exorbitant."


Download the judgment in full

Negligence: Sexual Abuse, Limitation Act A v Hoare & Others [2008] UKHL 6

(House of Lords; Lord Hoffmann, Lord Walker of Gestinghope, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Carswell and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood; 30 January 2008) Overruling Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498, which had created anomalies, the Lords held that Limitation Act 1975, s 11 did apply to a case of deliberate assault, including acts of indecent assault; therefore, in personal injury claims for damages arising out of sexual assaults and sexual abuse, the relevant limitation period was 3 years from the date of knowledge, with a judicial discretion to extend that period when it appeared that it would be equitable to do so. The appeal also raised the meaning of 'significant' injury in s 14(2), for the purposes of identifying the date of knowledge. The test in s 14(2) was an entirely impersonal standard; the question was not whether the claimant himself would have considered the injury sufficiently serious to justify proceedings, but whether the claimant would 'reasonably' have done so. The effect of the claimant's injuries upon what he could reasonably have been expected to do was irrelevant; the test was external to the claimant. The question whether the actual claimant, taking into account his psychological state in consequence of the injury, could reasonably have been expected to institute proceedings, was taken into account by the court when considering whether to exercise the discretion to extend the limitation period under s 33 of the Act. (Jordans Family Law)

New Hague Convention: International Recovery of Child Support and Maintenance

Professor William Duncan, Deputy Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law On 23 November 2007 more than 70 States, as well as the European Community, successfully concluded at The Hague, after negotiations which spanned four years, the new global Hague Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, as well as its first Protocol on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations. The new Convention holds the promise of a new era in the international recovery of maintenance one in which cross-border procedures, particularly in child support cases, should be simplified, swift, accessible and cost effective. The whole Convention applies on a mandatory basis to child support cases. The Convention also covers spousal support, but its provisions on administrative co-operation (ie the system whereby applications may be channelled through Central Authorities) will only apply to spousal support as between States which have made a positive declaration to that effect. Contracting States may also by declaration bring within the scope of the Convention (or any part of it) any other maintenance obligations arising from a family relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity. In this article Professor Duncan summaries the objectives and measures of the new Convention as well as providing a unique insight into the negotiations that preceded the signing of the Hague Convention. For the full article see [2008] International Family Law, Issue 1. (Jordans Family Law)

Threats to the integrity of trusts on marriage breakdown

William Massey, Partner, Farrer and Co LLP, UK Although the favourable tax regime has made England an attractive place for wealthy non-domiciliaries to live, it has also become an extremely good venue for their poorer spouses to bring divorce proceedings. Since the case of White in October 2000 and the subsequent decisions of, for example, London has become one of the most generous places for the less well off party to divorce and has regularly been described in the press as 'the divorce capital of the world'. Whereas before, the poorer spouse was limited to receiving sufficient money to satisfy their reasonable requirements, these recent cases have established the principle that property should be shared equally, unless there are good reasons to depart from this. At the same time, English courts also tend to be more generous in the level and duration for which spousal support will be payable. Of particular importance is that, unlike in many countries, under English divorce law the 'sharing' principle applies to all property, which may include trust interests. However, to the extent there is non-matrimonial property (for example property owned by one of the parties before the marriage or an interest in a trust established some time before marriage) these might be reasons for a departure from an equal division. The English court's approach, both in terms of generosity and its treatment of offshore discretionary trusts, was highlighted earlier this year in the well publicised case of Charman, heard by the English Court of Appeal, which has sent shockwaves through private wealth adviser circles. Not only did the court uphold the largest contested spousal award (of some &pound48 million), but it also affirmed the extremely robust approach English family courts often take to assets held in offshore trusts by treating assets of &pound68 million held in a Bermuda trust as though they were the husband's and available for division with his wife. In this article William Massey provides a detailed evaluation of the legal position of trusts on marriage breakdown and advises practitioners on how to mitigate the risk of trust assets being attacked on divorce. For the full article see [2008] International Family Law, Issue 1. (Jordans Family Law)

Jordans Top Five Family Law Cases of 2007

FRI 21/12/2007 - As 2007 draws to a close, Newswatch looks back at the five most significant family law cases over the last year. It has been an eventful year for family law practitioners with a major reform of legal aid by the Legal Services Commission, increased uncertainty about ancillary relief laws, the introduction of the Forced Marriage Act 2007, the further implementation of Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 and, several landmark judgments. Below are what we consider to be the most important five cases of 2007.

1.Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503

(Court of Appeal; Sir Mark Potter P, Thorpe and Wilson LJJ; 24 May 2007) The parties had been married for 28 years and had two children, now adult. The judge found that the parties' assets amounted to 131 million, including 68 million in an off-shore discretionary trust created by the husband upon an expression of wish that during his lifetime he should be its primary beneficiary. A trust set up for the children, containing assets of at least 30 million, was not treated as part of the assets to be divided. The judge awarded the wife 48 million, 36.5% of the assets; this was believed to be the highest ever award on determination of a contested application for ancillary relief in divorce proceedings. The wife had conceded a special contribution by the husband in the generation of the fortune, and the judge based his departure from equality on both the husband's special contribution, and the greater risks inherent in the assets remaining with the husband. Under a further order, if the husband was required to make specified tax payments (estimated by the husband at 11 million) the wife should contribute 36% of such payments (up to 3.5 million). The husband argued that the wife's award should have been no higher than 28 million, and that the money in the trust should not have been treated as assets of the parties, because the trust was a dynastic trust intended for the benefit of future generations.

2.Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17

(House of Lords; Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury; 25 April 2007) [2007] The Times April 26. The starting point in a case of joint legal ownership was joint beneficial ownership. A conveyance of a domestic property into joint names indicated both legal and beneficial joint tenancy, unless and until the contrary was proved. The burden would be upon the person seeking to show that the parties did intend their beneficial interests to be different from their legal interests. Many factors other than financial contribution were likely to be relevant, eg advice or discussions at the time of the transfer, reasons for acquisition in joint names, purpose of the home, financing of the purchase, and financing of the household. Cases in which joint legal owners would be taken to have intended that their beneficial interests should be different from their legal interests would be very unusual. Curiously in the context of homes conveyed into joint names, but without an express declaration of trust, the courts had sometimes reverted to the strict application of the principle of the resulting trust. The approach to quantification in cases in which the home was conveyed into joint names should certainly be no stricter than the approach to quantification in cases in which it had been conveyed into the name of one only, and to the extent that Walker v Hall [1984] FLR 126, Springette v Defoe [1992] 2 FLR 388 and Huntingford v Hobbs [1993] 1 FLR 736 held otherwise, they should not be followed. However, this case was a very unusual one, in that although the couple had cohabited for a long time and had four children together, they had kept their financial affairs rigidly separate. This was strongly indicative that they did not intend their share, even in the property in joint names, to be held equally. The woman had made good her claim for 65% of the property, having contributed far more to the acquisition of the house than had the man.

3.Hill v Haines [2007] EWCA Civ 1284

(Court of Appeal; Sir Andrew Morritt C, Thorpe and Rix LJJ; 5 December 2007) A property adjustment order made in ancillary relief proceedings, whether following a contested hearing or by consent, was made for consideration in money or moneys worth and could not therefore be set aside as a transaction at an undervalue. The order quantified the value of the applicant spouses statutory right to apply for financial provision by reference to the value of the money or property to be paid or transferred by the respondent spouse to the applicant spouse. Parliament could not have intended that a court order of this type be capable of automatic nullification on the suit of a bankrupt spouses trustee in bankruptcy.

4.North v North [2007] EWCA Civ 760

(Court of Appeal; Thorpe and May LJJ, Bennett J; 25 July 2007) The husband and wife divorced in 1978 after the wife had an affair. A financial order was made in 1981, settling (although not expressly dismissing) the wife's claims to capital by the husband's provision of a house for her and by his transferring ground rents to her to provide her with an annual income. The order also contained a provision for nominal periodic payments of five pence per annum until the wife remarried or until a further order was made.

In the following years the husband transferred further ground rents and investments to the wife, all together worth upwards of 30,000. He also carried out works to the wife's mother's property without charge and paid half of the wife's legal fees in connection with an application for a residence order in respect of a grandchild. Between 1978 and the present the wife chose not to work, and in 2000 moved to Australia, investing all her money there and living in a rented apartment in Sydney. The investments turned out to be unwise and the net result was that her assets and income dwindled drastically. The wife applied for a variation of the periodical payments order. The district judge ordered that the husband pay the wife a lump sum of 202,000 for the capitalisation and dismissal of the wife's periodical payments claim. The husband appealed.

The appeal would be allowed. In his judgment the district judge had absolved the husband of responsibility so that the order he then made amounted to a contradiction. It could not be said however that the wife's application for variation of the periodical payments order must be dismissed as a matter of principle: the factors upon which she relied were not excluded as a matter of statute or authority. The wife's failure to utilise her earning potential, her subsequent abandonment of the secure financial future provided for her by the husband and her lifestyle choices in Australia were matters which the husband could not be held responsible for in law. The investment losses fell into a different category and were more the outcome of hazard and came down to misfortune rather than mismanagement. In a second judgment handed down on 31 July the Court of Appeal awarded the wife 3000 a year in periodical payments, anticipating that the parties would agree a conventional capitalisation which would result in the dismissal of the wife's outstanding claims.

5.Ella v Ella [2007] EWCA Civ 99

(Court of Appeal; Thorpe and Maurice Kay LJJ and Charles J; 17 January 2007) The husband and wife both had dual British and Israeli nationality, but had been largely resident in England during the marriage. The husband had brought proceedings against the wife in Israel; the wife had brought proceedings against the husband in England. A pre-nuptial agreement between the parties provided that the law of Israel should apply. In the Israeli jurisdiction the wife had committed herself to a consent order concerning a postponement. The English judge agreed to stay the English proceedings, noting that the family's relationship with Israel was a profound one and identifying the pre-nuptial agreement as a major factor.

Whatever the relevance of the pre-nuptial agreement might be in England, it was undoubtedly a contract of considerable effect in the Israeli forum, of juridical advantage to the husband. An alternative basis for the judge's conclusion could be found in the history of the concurrent proceedings in Israel. If the husband obtained enforcement of the terms of the pre-nuptial agreement in Israel, the wife's prospects of getting permission to make a claim under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 were good, given the connections of the family with England.


23 June 2008

Convention on the Rights of the Child

Convention on the Rights of the Child

Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989

Entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49

Preamble

The States Parties to the present Convention,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person, and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,

Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,

Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community,

Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding,

Considering that the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society, and brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity,

Bearing in mind that the need to extend particular care to the child has been stated in the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924 and in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1959 and recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in particular in articles 23 and 24), in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in particular in article 10) and in the statutes and relevant instruments of specialized agencies and international organizations concerned with the welfare of children,

Bearing in mind that, as indicated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, "the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth",

Recalling the provisions of the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally; the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules); and the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, Recognizing that, in all countries in the world, there are children living in exceptionally difficult conditions, and that such children need special consideration,

Taking due account of the importance of the traditions and cultural values of each people for the protection and harmonious development of the child, Recognizing the importance of international co-operation for improving the living conditions of children in every country, in particular in the developing countries,

Have agreed as follows:

PART I

Article 1

For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.

Article 2

1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.

2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members.

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.

3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision.

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